[blml] Is ordinary Stayman no longer artificial? [SEC=UNOFFICIAL]

[Jerry Fusselman]

[Richard Hills]

But even if 2C Simple Stayman is taken for granted (not so in
Australia where Extended Stayman is common) it does not promise
clubs but rather implies at least one major instead.  Ergo, the
Definition of "artificial" should be construed to be consistent
with ->

[Law 29C]

If a call out of rotation is artificial, the provisions of Laws
30, 31 and 32 apply to the denomination(s) specified, rather
than the denomination named.

[Richard Hills]

-> so therefore 2C Simple Stayman remains artificial (although
Law 40B1(b) empowers the Regulating Authority to rule that 2C
Simple Stayman ceases as a Special Partnership Understanding).

[Richard Hills, later clarification]

I was over-succinct in my previous posting - I was not arguing
petititio principii via the preamble of Law 29C, my argument was
based on the core of Law 29C:

"...apply to the denomination(s) specified, rather than the
denomination named."

2C ordinary Stayman names clubs, but it does not _specify_ that
the Staymaner by partnership agreement promises that a club suit is
held in their hand.

[Jerry Fusselman]

When examined, this argument collapses.  It is a non sequitur, and it
looks like a great example for the next time I teach logic to graduate
students.  It is clearest to see what is wrong when we use symbolic
logic.

Let X be a bid.

Law 29C states

(A & B) ->  C,

where

A = "X is insufficient"
B = "X is artificial"
C = "The provisions of Laws 30, 31, and 32 apply to the
denomination(s) specified by X, rather than the denomination named by
X."

Similarly, in the case that interests us, C can be denoted

D -> E,

where

D = "The denomination(s) specified by X does not match the
denomination named by X"
E = "The provisions of Laws 30, 31, and 32 apply to the
denomination(s) specified by X."

Thus, law 29C states

(A & B) -> (D -> E).

Now Richard's argument contains two accurate premises:  (1) Ordinary
Stayman names the denomination clubs, but it does not specify clubs.
(2)  (A & B) -> (D -> E).

The conclusion he wants us to reach is that Ordinary Stayman in
artificial.  Obviously, he wants us to believe that the proposition "D
-> B" follows from (2), for that is the only way to achieve his
conclusion from the premises he gave.  But of course it doesn't.
That's why his argument is a non sequitur.  For example, B can false
at the same time that (2) is true.  That is, (2) says nothing about
the truth of B.

Also, Richard says he bases his argument "on the core of Law 29C,"
which from his quote must be some part of C, but that can be asserted
only if we assume A & B at least are true, which again is petitio
principii.

Anyway, there is nothing in Law 29C that precludes D being and B being
false for some X's.  We are left with the troubling 2007 definition of
artificial, which in my original posting I have shown (No one has yet
argued that I erred in any step) implies that ordinary Stayman is not
artificial.

If I have demonstrated the error in Richard's argument that ordinary
Stayman is artificial under the 2007 laws, I would still like to see
if anyone can make a valid argument that ordinary Stayman is
artificial under the new laws.  No one in this besides Richard has
even attempted it.  I find that peculiar.

Jerry Fusselman