[blml] Seven cases where potential UI is deemed more harmful thanMI in the laws

[Herman De Wael]

gesta at tiscali.co.uk wrote:
> Grattan Endicott<gesta at tiscali.co.uk
> [following address discontinued:
> grandeval at vejez.fsnet.co.uk]
> *******************************
> "Continuing to do the same thing 
>  hoping for a different outcome."
>            Einstein: definition of madness. 
>  +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Jerry Fusselman" <jfusselman at gmail.com>
> To: "Bridge Laws Mailing List" <blml at amsterdamned.org>
> Sent: Saturday, February 02, 2008 3:41 PM
> Subject: [blml] Seven cases where potential UI is deemed 
> more harmful thanMI in the laws
>> In all of these cases, potential UI is deemed more harmful 
>> than the MI:
>>
> +=+ An example of sophism. List a series of irregularities 
> and rectifications; then adulterate the account by inferring 
> a speculative basis for the procedures and presenting it as 
> factual rather than the surmise it is.  The laws, the rules of 
> a game, have no need of justification; they simply state 
> 'if X occurs then Y' . 
>                                            ~ G ~   +=+

Indeed Grattan, that's what the laws only need.

But is it too much to ask from the lawmakers that they write laws that 
are consistent? Or at least tell us why they may be inconsistent?

Jerry has done his best in finding a number of examples where the 
actions of a player might lead to either UI or MI. In all these seven 
cases, the player has options: one option leads to less MI but more 
UI, the other to more MI and less UI. There may be other cases, I 
would suggest that you try and find them. In these seven cases, the 
law tells the player what to do. In all seven cases, the law tells him 
to select the option that leads to more MI but less UI.

Now, the lawmakers do not need to tell us why they write laws, but 
after they have written them, it is allowed for us to guess those 
reasons. When in all seven cases, the same option is selected, is it 
so unwise of Jerry and myself that there is a pattern there?

Now, we are looking at an eighth case: the dws problem. Jerry, and I, 
have inferred from the seven other cases that it might well be good to 
do the same thing here. We even read a number of laws supporting our 
idea. Now the WBFLC tells us that we are wrong. We grant the WBFLC the 
right to say so.

But does the WBFLC not remotely feel that they might be in trouble 
here? Their predecessors wrote seven laws suggesting one thing, and 
now they are thinking of writing an eighth one suggesting just the 
opposite. Is it not time to think this over before proceeding?

Now Grattan, if you tell me that the WBFLC have thought this through, 
have looked at the inconsistency, admitted that it is there, and 
decided to still go ahead with this law change (yes, I believe it is a 
change - you are making inacceptable things that I thought were 
acceptable), then OK, I will accept that.

But don't come and tell me there is no inconsistency, or that this is 
just a small thing that does no harm. This is a major undertaking and 
until you have grasped the full implications of what you are 
contemplating, you should not go ahead with this.

Just a glimpse of what I mean with implications:
Imagine a player giving a "dws" style consistent explanation. The TD 
arrives and suspects that this is a dws-style infraction. But the 
player says he believed partner was giving a correct explanation, so 
he just continued with the correct explanation. The TD is tempted to 
believe that the first explanation may well be correct, but he finds 
no 100% proof for this. What should his ruling be? And should that 
ruling be any different depending on whether the player does it for 
dws reasons or if he genuinely believes partner to have been correct. 
And what should the penalty be then?
Mark my words, Grattan, this is a hornet's nest!

-- 
Herman DE WAEL
Antwerpen Belgium
http://users.skynet.be/hermandw/index.html