[blml] concession

[Eric Landau]

On Jan 6, 2008, at 12:53 PM, Sven Pran wrote:

>> On Behalf Of John Probst
> .................
>>> Example with five tricks left to play:
>>>
>>> 1: OK, you get three (also a claim of two as defined in Law 68A)

I don't find that "as defined" anywhere.  It certainly isn't in L68A,  
which is concerned exclusively with explicit claims.

>>> 2: I get two (also a concession of three as defined in Law 68B1)
>>>
>>> 3: You get three and I get two
>>>
>>> 4: I get two and you get three
>>
>> If partner immediately objects, play continues. They're all the same.
>> John
>
> That is exactly my opinion as well, but Tim apparently thinks  
> otherwise?

That's because he has some sense of the history of these laws,  
because he reads English unincumbered by preconceptions about what a  
particular law is supposed to mean by weight of authority (or  
repetition), and because he doesn't find imaginary definitions that  
aren't there.

> He seems to say that when a player begins his statement with the  
> word "I
> get" (or words to that effect) then it is primarily a claim for  
> which Law
> 68B2 cannot apply. If I have understood him correct his opinion is  
> that play
> can only continue under Law 68B2 with examples 1 and 3 above.

You have misunderstood him; his opinion is that the play of the cards  
can continue only in #1.  Tim notes that "any statement to the effect  
that a contestant will win a specific number of tricks is a claim"  
per L68A, and therefore any statement with the words "I get two" is  
governed by L68A and must be dealt with as a claim.  The state of  
play after a claim is dealt with by L68D.  It is not affected by  
L68B; we can rule in these situations as if L68B did not exist.  The  
presumtive claim in #1, if it existed, would be different in any  
case.  It would not be a claim under L68A, and would not be governed  
by it as the others are.  If L68B had created it, L68B would govern  
it.  But, as it happens, it doesn't even do that.

Tim's views are quite clear if you don't get hung up by assuming the  
contrary conclusion (viz. "they're all the same") up front, and  
supported by the actual words of L68.  They can be argued for without  
the need to invent principles (such as the one from which Sven  
deduces that "you get three" is "also a claim of two") or entities  
(such as "synchronous and inseparable" hybrid claim/concession  
thingies) that are nowhere to be found in TFLB.


Eric Landau
1107 Dale Drive
Silver Spring MD 20910
ehaa at starpower.net